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Abstract 
This paper describes the characteristics of systems of 
electronic voting in which both the vote itself and the 
authorization to vote circuíate through computer 
networks (telematic voting), with afocus on the problems 
arising from the need to ensure corred Identification of 
citizens seeking to access the voting system in a Europe-
wide environment. The advantages offered by such a 
system are discussed, as are the major social and legal 
implications these solutions may entail. 
1. Introduction 
We are now living through a process in which 
interpersonal activities or citizens' dealings with other 
social actors - activities that had been carried out through 
conventional forms of communication, and usually in 
person - are now increasingly being undertaken with 
computer networks, in what might be called the gradual 
introduction of the so-called Information Society. This 
transformation of the behavior of social actors 
unquestionably offers a number of advantages, but it also 
involves certain risks that must be taken into account in 
order to ensure that the modernization of Communications 
systems will result in an enhancement of the rights 
acquired to date and to win the trust of the citizens. 
Democratic voting processes in which the citizenry 
expresses its opinión and makes decisions in public affairs 
have not been isolated from this process of 
modernization. Thus, for many years we have seen 
increasing automation of every phase of the voting 
process. At first, systems have been developed that use 
computer-based electronic ballot boxes and, more 
recently, proposals have been made that rely on the 
remote Communications provided by telematic networks. 
Accurate identification of citizens who seek to vote is 
a crucial element for ensuring the democratic validity of 
any voting process. In the transition from in-person voting 
processes to remote voting through computer networks, 
one of the most sensitive aspects is verification of the 
identity of the voter by means of robust cryptographic and 
electronic methods so as to ensure the voter's right to 
participate in the voting process. 
These new forms of identification and behavior 
involve not only the technological development of 
complex systems: they also imply social, political and 
legal changes that must be taken into account as a 
preliminary step prior to the implementation of a new 
voting system. 
First, this article analyzes different options for 
automating the voting process and it discusses the 
differences between electronic voting in ballot boxes in 
sight of voters, on the one hand, and electronic voting in 
remote ballot boxes through computer networks 
(telematic voting) on the other. Next, it provides a 
summary description of the structure of such a system of 
telematic voting and the actions to be performed by 
voters. Then, the article will address the problem of 
identity and delegation of identity in systems of telematic 
voting in pan-European environments and specify which 
elements bear the greatest social and legal implications. 
2. Telematic voting involving European 
citizens 
For more than a decade in the European Union (EU), 
reciprocity agreements have allowed the citizens of 
certain countries to participate, as either electors or 
candidates, in elections held in another country of the 
Union where they are living [1]. 
Further, as cooperation between countries in the Union 
grows ever more intense, it will become ever more 
common for some people to travel to other EU countries 
for diverse work-related reasons. The number of people 
traveling in Europe for pleasure or personal reasons is 
also likely to increase. In all such cases, if remote voting 
through telematic networks is implemented, citizens will 
be able to participate in elections being held in their 
countries of origin. 
2.1 Telematic voting: the development of 
electronic voting in cyberspace 
We shall use the term electronic voting to refer to an 
automated process of casting and tallying votes. In such a 
system, electronic machines in sight of voters are used to 
cast a vote in an electronic process. These computer 
systems, called voting machines or voting equipment, are 
replacing traditional ballot boxes. In electronic voting 
ballots are inserted, captured and stored in an electronic 
format and then automatically tally votes once the voting 
is over. 
A more advanced phase in the automation of electoral 
processes is represented by "telematic voting", in which 
case voting is effected with the use of telematic networks 
and specific telematic agents whereby a vote is cast in a 
remote ballot box which is located out of sight of the 
voter. In this system, the entire process is automated: 
from the identification of voters all the way to the tallying 
of votes, including the casting of votes themselves. Both 
the authorization to vote and the vote itself "travel" 
through a network. 
Why should it be called telematic voting? Quite often, 
the literature uses the term electronic voting (eVoting) for 
what we cali herein telematic voting. The answer is that 
we believe it is more useful to maintain a nomenclature 
that distinguishes electronic voting and telematic voting 
because an in-person vote and a vote in a remote ballot 
box are alternatives with both a technological dimensión 
and socio-political requirements that are radically 
different, and a failure to clearly differentiate between 
them will genérate confusión among the public. 
Telematic voting is also sometimes called remote 
voting; but voting by mail is also a form of remote voting 
and thus creates further confusión. As a result, if we cali 
both types of voting electronic voting (eVoting), one 
would have to say in each case "electronic voting with an 
in-person voting machine" or "remote electronic voting", 
but that would involve an unnecessary complication and 
add further difficulties of public understanding. 
In general, two types of scenarios for telematic voting 
can be distinguished: 
type a) Voting requires going to specific voting sites in 
person. In such a case, the telematic voting 
process must be supported by its own, 
functionally independent, telematic components: 
a terminal for authentication, a terminal for 
casting a vote, a remote ballot box, systems for 
managing and tallying votes, etc. Further, it 
must use its "own" telematic network dedicated 
solely to the voting process. 
typeb) The voter can vote from anywhere, even from 
home. In such an arrangement, voters would use 
their own connection device to cast the vote and 
ordinary services of an ISP for authentication 
and sending the vote to a remote ballot box. This 
specific type of telematic voting can be called 
Internet voting. 
In reality, when a type a scenario speaks of using its 
"own" telematic network dedicated solely to the voting 
process, this does not necessarily refer to a complete 
network, from links and the physical level until transport 
servers, dedicated exclusively to the voting system. Henee 
the in verted commas. The most reasonable option would 
be a virtual network supported on an Internet data 
transport infrastructure. For example, in the Votescript+ 
system [2], the virtual voting network is divided into three 
independent virtual networks in order to preserve voter 
anonymity by preventing the múltiple votes or voting by 
individuáis that are not eligible to do so. These networks 
are: the Authentication Network, the Voting Network and 
the Verification Network, as shown in figure 1. 
The framework of "type a" telematic voting includes 
the Votescript proposal, which has been designed and 
developed by the authors of this article with the 
participation of a more extensive multidisciplinary team 
where sociologists and jurists took part. 
To reinforce the anonymity of voting, the Votescript+ 
telematic voting system described in summary fashion in 
this paper includes use of an infrastructure that supports 
the electronic Identity Card (eID Card), which is a smart 
card capable of electronic signatures and reliable 
identification of its owner and which is starting to be used 
in a number of EU countries, among them Spain. This 
card is not used in the voting phase, in order to robustly 
sepárate the identification/authorization phase from the 
secret ballot casting phase. Even though the eID Card is 
once again used in the verification phase, a complete 
infrastructure is not required to guarantee citizens' 
identity. Different phases of the process also make use of 
another card, the Smart Voting Card (SVC+), which is 
generic and identical for all voters. Information 
identifying the user cannot be extracted from this card. 
The SVC+ contains programs and stores data in a way 
that no user termináis in any of the networks require 
cryptographic capacities or data storage capacities. 
Further, it is useful to emphasize that the possession of a 
valid identity document does not necessarily mean being 
eligible to vote, as voting rights may have been lost in a 
court ruling, or due to residence in a región outside the 
scope of the given voting process or non-eligibility for 
reasons of age, etc. 
From the point of view of the voter, the voting process 
can be divided into five phases, which are briefly 
described as foliows: 
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In phase 1, the voter makes use of both the eID Card system Authentication Points and requests authorization 
and the SVC+ to identify him or herself in any of the to cast a vote; authorization will be denied if the voter has 
already gone through the process previously or if the 
person is not a part of the electorate. The authorization 
request issued through the execution of processes 
specifically designed for this purpose stored in the Smart 
Voting Card (SVC+) consists of a key (KdV, hidden in the 
card with an opacity factor to prevent subsequent linkage 
of the vote with the voter) that will later be used to 
decipher the vote. The authorization request carries an 
electronic signature provided by the eID Card. 
Authentication Intervention Systems and the 
Administration System decide whether to issue 
authorization. This authorization key (KdV), which is 
blindly signed by the Administration System and the 
Authentication Intervention Systems, will be a guarantee 
in the next phase that the vote has been cast by a 
legitímate voter. Validation of the identity of a citizen 
seeking to vote is performed with the eID Card and with 
the collaboration of a Validation Center in accordance 
with the processes and protocols established by the public 
authorities. That is, Votescript+ delegates to the eID Card 
scheme the assurance of voter identity. The Validation 
Center is external to Votescript+, as a resource provided 
by the eID Card infrastructure. Over time, as this 
assurance becomes more robust and wins public trust in 
its incorporation to daily life, Votescript+ will inherit the 
enhancement because of this delegation. 
Therefore, before implementing a telematic voting 
system using eID Cards for voter authentication, 
educational campaigns must be carried out on the security 
offered by these systems and sociological studies made to 
corrobórate public trust in digital methods of 
identification. 
Phase 2 (voting itself) for the voter starts after 
receiving authorization. To cast a vote, the voter simply 
reports to any voting cabin with the SVC+ (the eID Card 
is unnecessary). Inside the cabin and isolated from 
external interference, the voter will find resources that 
will enable him or her to cast a vote ciphered with a key 
known only to the SVC+ that has generated it, (KcV), 
which is symmetrical to the KdV used recently. The vote is 
ciphered in a way that the ballot box cannot decipher the 
bit of information it receives. Finally, the card securely 
stores the vote receipt it receives from the ballot box. 
Phase 3 (tally) will begin once the two prior phases 
have concluded. Here the ballot box is opened, and it 
transfers to the Tallier (T) and the Tallier Intervention 
Systems the votes it has stored while phases 1 and 2 were 
active. Each receptor of the contents of the ballot box, 
acting simultaneously, so that all the controllers can 
corrobórate them. 
Phase 4 (verification) is divided into two parts. In the 
first part, (4.1) clarification is effected of all possible 
divergences between the results of the official tally and 
those produced by the Tallier Intervention Systems, for all 
have received the same data from the ballot box. In the 
second part (phase 4.2), the voter once again plays a 
central role, as he or she can now access the Verification 
Network and review the treatment given their own vote 
by submitting some of the data stored in the smart card, 
which will be checked against the information made 
public by the Tally Board. A voter may present a 
challenge to the election authority in the event of a 
discrepancy and provide solid proof, such as the vote 
receipt issued by the ballot box. The election authority 
will access the records of different agents and the 
information released in order to settle any claims 
presented by controllers; and if the claim has been filed 
by a voter, it will also access the information stored on the 
pertinent SVC+. 
Why cali it telematic voting and not Internet voting? 
Quite often, what we cali herein telematic voting is called 
Internet voting. From the discussion in the previous 
paragraphs, one should conclude that this term is 
inappropriate for a voting scenario like the one we have 
specified in type a. Even though the transport 
infrastructure of Internet is used (which need not be the 
case at all times and in all its scope) this does not mean 
that Internet is being used, at least from the user point of 
view. Internet means openness and multiplicity of access, 
making it much more than a transport infrastructure. 
Although a road network represents a vehicle transport 
infrastructure - and little more - the Internet represents a 
data transport infrastructure and much more. 
Only in the case we have classified as type b - where 
the vote can be cast from any point of access to the 
Internet, or even from home - would it be appropriate to 
use the term Internet voting for telematic voting. We 
believe this method to be unfeasible when sociopolitical 
environments involve certain risk of masquerade or vote 
selling. Nevertheless for configuring electoral systems 
with political validity, for many other voting contexts in 
which the valué at stake is much lower (for example, 
elections in sport or cultural associations, local processes 
of political participation, etc.), a system of Internet voting 
can be an economical and viable option, if it takes into 
account the security requirements of the given 
environment. Studies on social acceptance or rejection 
must be done carefully not to misuse terms. 
2.2 The problem of identity verification in 
pan-European telematic vote processes 
As mentioned, the proposal for telematic voting 
presented herein makes an important delegation of voter 
authentication to the reliability of the document used to 
identify voters and thereby reproduces the arrangement 
used in conventional voting processes with paper ballots 
in many countries. Possession of a valid identification 
document is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
cast a vote. This is because a European Union citizen with 
a document may not have reached the mínimum age 
required to be eligible to vote, or local elections may 
require that voters reside in a certain geographic área, etc. 
From this point of view, the existence of "electoral rolls" 
maintains and even becomes greater in importance. At 
present, a European Union citizen residing in a country 
other than his or her country of origin can be entered in 
the electoral roll of the place of residence to elect 
members of the European Parliament and must give 
information on the country, región and municipality in 
which the person's voting rights were last exercised in 
order to be removed from that electoral district. In 
nowadays, it may make little sense to exercise stricter 
controls than these, which place their trust in citizens' 
honesty, at least for the moment and given the low public 
interest shown by high abstention rates. More effective 
controls should be in place before they have become 
crucial: that is, when a valué that is vital to the public is at 
stake. 
Citizens' new relationship with democratic institutions 
must be ready to provide a good response to new 
situations in advance. To achieve this, European 
authorities must have opened new paths for the exchange 
of information with each other that, firstly do not give rise 
to illegal acts of registration in electoral rolls and, 
secondly, that manage in their entire scope of jurisdiction 
the temporary suspensión for legal reasons or definitive 
removal (death, change of nationality, etc) of citizens 
from electoral rolls. 
Implementation in European Union countries of a 
telematic voting system such as the one proposed herein 
will bring benefits beyond sheer technological 
modernization. The change of technology will allow for 
offering greater guarantees of accuracy both in the 
identification of votes and in the tallying and 
communicating of results, while enabling control by 
citizens in a way that is unthinkable or unfeasible in 
conventional systems: each citizen will have irrefutable 
proof of how his or her vote was handled in the general 
tallying of results. 
It will also allow for designing system 
Communications interfaces with voters that can adapt to 
individual circumstances such as disabilities or other 
peculiarities to facilitate independence in casting a vote. 
Such circumstances affect both citizens who do not know 
the local languages and those with difficulties of sight or 
movement, or those who for any other reason are away 
from their residence on voting day, provided they are 
within the jurisdiction of an EU country. 
The implementation of these systems carry legal 
implications, as properly benefiting from the 
improvements offered by these systems will require 
addressing the need for a reform of laws in each country 
and a discussion of the appropriateness of elaborating 
laws that would affect all European citizens equally. 
3. Voters' digital identity 
The need has become evident to establish methods that 
can unify the identification of EU citizens and enable 
them to exercise, in equal conditions, the different roles 
that arise in the operation of an electoral system: as 
voters, candidates, representatives of political parties, etc. 
For a number of years, some European countries have 
had systems for identifying their citizens based on the 
display of a document issued by the state attesting to a 
person's identity: these are the national ID Cards. This 
type of document has evolved over time from a simple 
sheet of paper with a series of personal details, all the way 
to documents equipped with strong anti-forgery 
mechanisms and mechanisms for identifying the bearer, 
such as a photograph, a handwritten signature and 
fingerprint. At present, national ID Cards in Europe have 
similar content in all countries. 
Some EU countries have been generating in recent 
years new identity documents that consist of a forgery-
resistant smart card fitted with a chip with cryptographic 
capacities that can reliably identify the proprietor and 
digitally sign a document in electronic format using a 
prívate key stored inside. 
This new form of identification has become more 
widespread without encountering significant reserves in 
the public. Nevertheless, the introduction of this new type 
of digital identification will carry a large number of social 
implications that, to date, have not been sufficiently well 
analyzed. Thus, we believe that multidisciplinary studies 
are needed - with researchers from the fields of 
technology, politics, sociology and law - to exercise 
influence with the public authorities to ensure that the 
implementation of these systems and the legal reforms 
they imply is done in a manner that protects the rights 
citizens have acquired and respects their right to decide. 
In both countries that have traditional identification 
systems and those which do not, citizens will have to be 
given an electronic or digital identity that will enable 
them to identify themselves in the network with at least 
the same guarantees provided by their national ID Cards 
in personal interactions. The telematic voting system will 
benefit from the deployment an infrastructure that will 
enable citizens of European Union countries to have their 
own electronic identification cards. Present national eID 
Cards, with an external appearance that is similar to 
traditional identification documents, consist of a smart 
card that can incorpórate biometric identification, are 
presumably more reliable than traditional documents to 
identify their proprietor. At the request of the proprietor, 
cryptographic processes are executed in the chip to 
authenticate a citizen and, in his or her ñame, digitally 
sign a document. This property, along with protection of 
data stored on the card, lend an electronic signature 
greater guarantees than those provided in a traditional 
handwritten signature, making authenticity verifications 
more robust than those provided by calligraphy experts. 
These eID Cards are already being issued in Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and 
Spain. 
As mentioned in section 2.1, validation of citizen 
identification in Votescript+ begins the phase of 
authentication in the system, is performed with an eID 
Card with the collaboration of a Validation Center. The 
Validation Center is a component of the eID Card 
identification infrastructure that contains information on 
each and every one of the eID Cards produced in a given 
country. 
Thus, if a telematic voting process is being held in 
Spain and a citizen seeking to vote accesses the system 
with an eID Card generated in Spain, the Validation 
Center will use established communication protocols to 
notify the Votescript+ of the approval or rejection of the 
validity of the digital information contained in the eID 
Card presented by the voter. In contrast, if a Belgian 
citizen seeks to vote from a voting site in Spain, the 
Spanish Validation Center cannot approve or reject the 
validity of the eID Card on its own, but must establish 
peer-to-peer communication with the Belgian Validation 
Center and await an affirmative or negative response. 
This necessary interoperability between the systems 
controlling the operations of eID Cards in Europe-wide 
telematic voting environments introduces an added level 
of complexity, as it requires homogenization not only 
from a technical point of view, but also in the laws and 
policies regulating electoral processes in EU countries. 
Control over the right to vote in EU countries is 
becoming extremely complicated. This is due not only to 
the múltiple types of elections, but also the selective right 
to participate in some elections and not others. For 
example, an EU citizen who is a foreigner in France can 
vote in French local elections without losing the right to 
participate in the same type of local elections in another 
country; the same is not the case when electing members 
of the European Parliament, where it is made clear that a 
citizen can cast a vote only once. This same person cannot 
participate in the national elections of France. 
Consequently, registration in the census for one type of 
elections does not automatically imply registration in 
another. Proper management of censuses demands quick 
and truthful Communications between the countries 
involved. 
Acquainting citizens with the use of this identification 
card in different types of telematic transactions will lend 
telematic voting systems further support and lessen 
mistrust among the public regarding the honesty of the 
system. We believe, however, that an in-depth study of 
legal and social reality is required before adding the new 
voting system to this new form of identification. 
4. Identity delegation 
One of the most important issues being addressed in 
the context of digital identity is delegation of identity. 
This occurs when a person or organization ask a third 
party to act on their behalf [3]. Roles for representing 
others in telematic voting systems include representation 
by individuáis of political parties, candidates, or citizens' 
groups, or when a voter delegates the casting of a vote to 
another voter. 
4.1 Representation of political groupings 
Both in the globalized environment of Europe and 
internally in each country, citizens organize politically in 
political parties or other types of groupings. In 
Votescript+, these organizations play an important role in 
exercising oversight of the system. The European scene 
includes everything from the most pan-European parties 
to the most locally oriented parties, whose very existence 
and purpose are limited to a specific geographic área. 
What they have in common is that they will have to 
appoint representatives before the system, and these must 
bear dual identification: first, they will have to identify 
themselves personally with valid credentials and, 
secondly, they will have to document the organization's 
decisión to delégate them. The nationality of the delegatee 
and the delegator will no longer be a barrier once Europe 
has an effective infrastructure to allow for cross-border 
delegation [4] 
4.2 Representation of an absent voter 
Apart from the obvious difficulties of managing 
identifications, another arises in relation to the facilities 
provided by countries to their citizens to deliver their vote 
even when they will not be in the vicinity of a voting 
station on election day. We may be tempted to believe 
that this will no longer be a problem because telematic 
networks will provide a solution, as the vote will travel 
over the network. But this solution will only be valid for 
citizens traveling within the EU and nowhere else in the 
world [5]. 
In Spain, any voter expects to have trouble going to a 
polling station within the specified time frame can send 
the vote by post, after having applied for the ballot and 
supplied identification to a post office civil servant 
handling the request. In this voting option, the voter 
implicitly waives several fundamental rights they could 
otherwise enjoy if the right to vote were exercised in a 
traditional way: at the post office, there are no 
representatives of the political parties acting as guarantors 
of voter identification or access free of coerción, ñor are 
the votes given appropriate custody until the tally is made. 
In France, the debate on the weaknesses of voting by post 
was settled by prohibition of voting (as in many other 
countries), while proxy voting is allowed, so that a voter 
can designate a trusted representative, who will also act as 
a voter in their own right in the election and thus cast both 
votes: the proxy's own vote and the vote entrusted by the 
delegator, supposedly fulfilling the will of the latter. If the 
French approach, or similar versions in effect in the 
United Kingdom and Holland [5] were to spread in 
Europe, delegation of electronic identity and its 
revocation must be sufficiently mature in order to be 
incorporated in the processes of voter authentication 
required by telematic voting. Acceptance of any of these 
methods of identity delegation in different countries will 
entail changes in the law that we believe must be enacted 
only after they have been socially and politically 
accepted. 
5. Conclusions 
The expansión of computer networks will enable the 
implementation of voting systems in which both the vote 
itself and the authorization to vote will circuíate on a 
network (telematic voting), thus noticeably facilitating 
voters' access to the voting system. The Votescript+ 
system the authors of this paper have developed shows 
the technological viability of these alternatives and 
guarantees voter rights of confidentiality, non-coercion 
and anonymity. 
One of the most significant issues posed by the 
Internet and other computer networks relates to the need 
to guarantee users' identity as they access the services 
available to them. Specifically in regards to telematic 
voting systems, accurate identification of voters is a 
decisive factor in the democratic validity of the system. 
This paper shows that robust and reliable solutions based 
on eID Cards are available for correctly identifying voters 
and it discusses the major social and legal implications 
these systems may entail. 
The development of voting systems, with the 
incorporation of telematic systems, must take into account 
the fact that electoral processes are closely linked to both 
the peculiarities and the history of the peoples using them. 
A multidisciplinary study that encompasses sociology, 
law, politics and technology must be undertaken prior to 
instituting any new system so as not to jeopardize either 
the confidence of electors or the fortitude of democratic 
institutions. 
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